SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN THIRD CIRCUIT LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of recent Third ircuit cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, we hope
to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of the more interesting changes in significantareas of practice.
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CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-FIFTH

AMENDMENT

AND

EIGHTH

AMENDMENT--STATE STATUTE ALLOWING EVICTION OF TENANT
CONVICTED OF DRUG OFFENSE IS NOT PUNITIVE AND, THEREFORE,
DOES NOT VIOLATE EITHER DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE OR

EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE-Taylor v. Cisneros, 102 F.3d 1334 (3d
Cir. 1996).
Silas Taylor, Jr. had resided as a tenant in a low-income apartment
in Bayonne, New Jersey since 1988. See Taylor v. Cisneros, 102 F.3d
1334, 1336 (3rd Cir. 1996). The apartment is part of a housing project
that is owned and operated by the Bayonne Housing Authority (Housing
Authority). Taylor received a monthly social security payment of $497
because he is hearing and speech impaired. The fair monthly rental value
of Taylor's apartment was $706. Taylor's rent was subsidized by the
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, resulting
in his paying just $125 per month.
On October 20, 1992, Taylor pleaded guilty to possessing narcotics
paraphernalia on the Housing Authority property where his apartment
was located. On February 3, 1994, Taylor again pleaded guilty to possession of narcotics paraphenalia, although he did not commit this offense
on the Housing Authority's property. The Bayonne Municipal Court
fined Taylor $625 and sentenced him to thirty days imprisonment for the
second conviction. See id. at 1337.
The New Jersey State Legislature adopted the Anti-Eviction Act,
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:18-61.1 (West Supp. 1996) (Act) in 1974, with the
goal of protecting residential tenants from arbitrary eviction. The Act
delineates the conditions whereby a tenant may be removed from either
private or public housing. Pursuant to the statute, landlords must demonstrate "good cause" in order to remove a tenant. See id. at 1341. The
Act permits eviction if a tenant violates the Comprehensive Drug Reform
Act of 1987, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-1 (West 1995), which relates to
"the possession of drug paraphernalia 'within or upon the leased premises or complex of buildings and land appurtenant thereto

. . .

in which

those premises are located.'" Id. at 1337. In accordance with the AntiEviction Act, on November 29, 1994, the Housing Authority served
Taylor with a notice terminating his tenancy. The parties agreed that
Taylor violated the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1987 and that
the Housing Authority properly evicted Taylor pursuant to the statute.
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Taylor brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that his eviction infringed upon his rights under the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution because
he had already been punished in state court for the drug offense. See id.
Further, Taylor claimed that the eviction violated the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eight Amendment. See id. The Housing Authority then
sought Taylor's eviction in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Hudson
County, Special Civil Part, by filing a summary dispossession proceeding. See id. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. See
id.
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey reviewed the case as a facial challenge to the Anti-Eviction Act. See id.
The court found that the eviction was not "punishment" and hence did
not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. See id. at 1338. Furthermore,
the court held that the Housing Authority did not violate the Excessive
Fines Clause because the eviction proceedings were not punitive in nature. See id. After considering the purposes of the relevant provision of
the Act, the district court noted that "the eviction of 'an insidious tenant
is a rational and effective means of protecting all other tenants from activity antithetical to their health, safety and welfare'" and is consequently
not punishment, but rather the remediation of an existing problem. Id.
The district court therefore entered summary judgment in favor of the
Housing Authority, and Taylor appealed. See id. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that Taylor's eviction did not violate his constitutional rights because the eviction was not "punishment."
See id. at
1340.
Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Greenberg began the court's
analysis by citing the tripartite test the Third Circuit enunciated in Artway
v. Attorney General for determining whether a state action is punitive.
See id. (citing 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996)). The court explained that
under Artway, a law is not punitive if: (1) the legislature's subjective
purpose was not to punish; (2) the legislature's objective purpose in
terms of proportionality and history was not punitive; and (3) the Act's
effects did not amount to punishment. See id. The judge then posited
that even if a measure passes the first two tests, it will be deemed punishment if the effects were adequately severe. See id. The Third Circuit
noted that the threshold a measure must pass before it is deemed
"punishment" is not easily reached. See id.
Judge Greenberg observed that the United States Supreme Court recently held that a civil forfeiture of property is generally not punishment
for Double Jeopardy purposes. See id. (citing United States v. Ursery,
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116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996)). The judge stressed that the Ursely Court had
drawn an important distinction between civil forfeitures and civil penalties. See id. The court dismissed Taylor's argument that the loss of his
subsidized lease outweighed any harm he caused, noting that the Urseiy
court rejected the need for a balancing test in cases where there was a
forfeiture instead of a fine. See id. at 1341.
Judge Greenberg then reviewed New Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act.
See id. The court commented that under the Act, a residential tenant may
only be removed for "good cause." See id. The court noted that "good
cause" encompasses a wide variety of factors that may or may not be related to a tenant's conduct. See id. The judge opined that the Act reflects the legislature's acknowledgment that it is improper "to deny a
landlord the right to terminate a lease when its property is being used for
an unlawful purpose." Id. A landlord, the Third Circuit observed, has a
considerable interest in preventing criminal activity from taking place on
its property. See id. The court then recognized that the decision to bring
an action to remove a tenant who commits a drug offense is solely within
the landlord's discretion. See id.
Next, the judge acknowledged that even if the Act did not exist,
landlords would still be able to stipulate in their leases that renters must
obey the drug laws or be subject to eviction. See id. Furthermore,
Judge Greenberg observed that a tenant's conviction for a drug-related
offense commited on a landord's premises is admissible evidence in an
eviction proceeding against a tenant. See id. The court also referred to
other sections of the Anti-Eviction Act that permit removal of tenants for
purposes wholly unrelated to any wrongdoing on the part of the tenant.
See id. at 1342. For instance, the panel proffered, lessees could be
evicted because of the landlord's need to comply with the law or desire to
withdraw the property from residential use. See id.
Applying the first prong of the Artway test, the court found that the
legislature's subjective intent in promulgating the Act was not punitive.
See id. Rather, the court posited, the legislature's purpose was to permit
landlords to protect their property from a tenant who violates the law on
their property. See id. The court next addressed the constitutionality of
the relevant subsection under Artway's objective test. See id. The judge
declared that the Act clearly possessed a remedial or salutary purpose because it allows a landlord to evict a tenant who uses the property for an
unlawful purpose. See id. Judge Greenberg acknowledged that the remedial purpose is especially important in light of the fact that a landlord's property may be forfeited if the landlord is aware of illegal drug
activity on the premises, yet fails to take steps to control it. See id.
Furthermore, the Third Circuit emphasized that a landlord has a duty to
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other tentants to provide a safe environment. See id. The court also
noted that historically, the removal of a tenant has not been considered
punishment because tenants could be evicted for a variety of reasons that
are traditionally not considered punitive. See id.
The panel next considered whether eviction, as permitted under the
Act, was so severe that it should be considered a "punishment" for
Double Jeopardy purposes. See id. Judge Greenberg noted that when
reviewing a Double Jeopardy claim, the court will not balance the value
of forfeited property against the harm to the government. See id. The
court next observed that even certain governmental actions having severe
effects, such as the termination of social security benefits, are not
"punishment." See id. The judge reasoned that if the loss of social security benefits, which may be crucial to an elderly or disabled person, is
not considered a punishment, then the loss of a subsidized lease should
not be termed a "punishment." See id.
The Third Circuit next dismissed Taylor's claim that forfeiture is

analogous to a penalty.

See id. Judge Greenberg enunciated that the

New Jersey Supreme Court's characterization of forfeiture as
"punishment" is not applicable in a Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy
analysis. See id. at 1343. Instead, the court posited that in a Double
Jeopardy analysis the Third Circuit would look to the United States Supreme Court's civil forfeiture jurisprudence. See id. The court reiterated that the Ursery Court held that civil forfeiture is not akin to a penalty. See id.
Judge Greenberg then maintained that in light of the Ursery Court's
less demanding test for "punishment," the court's prior Artway analysis
may have been redundant. See id. The judge noted that the Ursery test
only inquired into whether the legislature intended the eviction proceedings to be civil or criminal and whether the proceedings are so punitive
as to deem them criminal in nature, regardless of the legislature's purpose. See id. In short, Judge Greenberg proclaimed that eviction proceedings are civil in nature. See id
The court concluded the Double Jeopardy analysis by presenting a
brief summary of its holding. See id. The court asserted that the state
eviction proceeding was entirely independent of the criminal justice system because the Housing Authority, not the prosecutor, was seeking
Taylor's ouster. See id. The judge continued by stating that the Housing
Authority was seeking a traditional civil remedy available to both public
and private landlords. See id. The court again noted that notwithstanding the Act, landlords and tenants could agree in their lease that drug use
is a ground for eviction. See id. The court objected to the proposition
that a tenant could actually benefit from a conviction "by using it as
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shield against a landlord's attempt to protect its property and the other
tenants." Id. at 1343-44. The court noted that it would be nonsensical if
a landlord could not seek to evict a tenant for illegal drug activities simply because the prosecutor had brought criminal proceedings against the
tenant for those activities. See id. at 1344. Therefore, the court held
that for Double Jeopardy purposes, the loss of a subsidized lease does not
constitute "punishment." See id.
The court next addressed Taylor's contention that his eviction under
the Act violated the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
See id. Judge Greenberg stated that a forfeiture can only violate the Excessive Fines Clause if the forfeiture is deemed a punishment. See id.
The judge noted that the Supreme Court has determined that a forfeiture
constitutes punishment if its sole purpose was not remedial. See id.
Finding no Excessive Fines Clause violation, the court opined that the
language and legislative intent of the Act contradict any interpretation of
Taylor's eviction as punishment. See id.
The Third Circuit has strengthened a landlord's right to evict tenants
who break the law on their property. The Taylor decision also greatly
benefits the neighbors of tenants involved in drug activity who are threatened by the proliferation of drugs and the crime that often accompanies
such behavior in many public housing complexes. While it is unfortunate
that the disabled Silas Taylor, Jr. will be evicted, it is even more unfortunate that children living in apartment complexes with drug dealers have
to encounter this threat on a daily basis. Thus, the provision of the Act
that permits landlords to evict tenants who are convicted of a drug offense is necessary to protect our nation's urban apartment complexes
from the scourge of drugs.
The Third Circuit has also properly adopted a narrow interpretation
of what constitutes "punishment" for Double Jeopardy purposes. As the
court pointed out, removal of tenants like Taylor is remedial and ameliorative. In the same vein, it is important to note that there is no constitutional right to subsidized public housing. Indeed, such housing is a
privilege which may be forfeited by tenants who violate the law. To this
end, this act attempts to remedy the shortage of public housing stock by
freeing up apartments for those who are more deserving of them.
HowardJ. Brookman °

*The author may be reached through the Internet at Brookmho@shu.edu.
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CRIMINAL

DEFENDANT REPRESENTED AT TRIAL BY COUNSEL WHO
PREJUDICES THE DEFENSE BY PURSUING No REASONABLE TRIAL
STRATEGY IS DENIED THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND IS ENTITLED TO HABEAS

CoRPus RELIEF-Berryman v. Morton, 100 F.3d 1089 (3d Cir.
1996).
At approximately 2:30 A.M. on March 12, 1983, Alice Campos left
a night club in Newark, New Jersey with her friend Christina Dos Santos. See Berryman v. Morton, 100 F.3d 1089, 1091 (3d Cir. 1996).
After driving Dos Santos to her home in Irvington, New Jersey and
dropping her friend off, Campos stopped at a traffic light where a man
forcibly entered her car. According to Campos, the man, whom she subsequently identified as Michael Bunch, held a knife to her throat and demanded that she remove her panty hose. After Campos handed him her
stockings, another man, whom she later identified as Anthony Bludson,
got in the car, and the two men drove her to a nearby parking lot where a
third man, later identified by Campos as Earl Berryman, was waiting in a
blue car. The men ordered Campos to get into the back seat of the blue
vehicle. Although Campos initially disclosed to police that she was
blindfolded with her panty hose after Bunch and Bludson entered her car
and before they met up with Berryman, Campos testified that she saw the
faces of all three men when they forced her into the car.
According to Campos' testimony, the three men drove Campos
around for approximately two hours while forcing her to lie down on the

floor in the rear of the car. Finally, the men drove Campos to an abandoned building, carried her inside, and raped her in turn. See id. at
1092. After the rape, the three men drove Campos back to her car and
drove away. Campos testified that she waited two days before reporting
the incident because she was frightened, hysterical, and did not think that
she could report the rape until the following business day.
When Campos did report to the police on March 14, 1985, Detective Samuel Williams showed her photographs of African-American
males organized alphabetically by last name and placed in books containing about 100 to 150 photographs, with the names not visible to Campos.
Unable to recognize anyone from the section of the book comprised of
photographs of men with last names that began with "A," Campos began
to peruse the "B" section of the book and noted the photographs of Earl
Berryman, Michael Bunch and Anthony Lee Bludson. Believing that
Campos had identified her assailants, she never looked at the police photographs of men with last names beginning in the letters "C" through
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"Z." Additionally, Campos was examined by a physician who discovered physical evidence consistent with a sexual assault and also found
that Campos had contracted gonorrhea. Because of the length of time
that had passed since the incident, the physician did not attempt to retrieve any excretion traces that could help to identify the assailants.
While Detective Williams mailed letters to Berryman, Bunch, and
Bludson based on Campos' identifications, the police took no further action for almost a year. Williams testified that his superior, Sergeant Michael Tomich, instructed him not to pursue the rape investigation because
Bunch was also a suspect in a bank robbery/homicide investigation and
Detective Tomich hoped that Bunch would eventually incriminate himself
in the homicide if he was left on the street. Finally, on January 19,
1984, the three men were indicted and charged with numerous offenses in
connection with the kidnapping and rape of Campos.
Bludson went to trial first and, following a mistrial, was ultimately
acquitted. See id. The joint trial of Berryman and Bunch also resulted in
an initial mistrial due to a juror's improper discussions with other jurors,
but both men were convicted at the conclusion of the retrial. See id. At
trial, Berryman denied taking part in the crime and testified that he did
not have a driver's license and had never met Bludson nor Bunch. See
id. With no previous indictments, Berryman's conviction was based entirely on Campos' uncorroborated identification. See id. at 1093.
Campos testified in the trials of Bludson, Berryman, and Bunch.
See id. The descriptions she gave in the early trials differed from her
testimony at Berryman's trial, but Berryman's attorney, Nicholas DePalma, failed to make reference to the prior inconsistent testimony to discredit Campos' identification. See id. Also, DePalma did not call either
Bludson or Dos Santos as a witness for the defense. See id. DePalma,
nonetheless, did evoke testimony that permitted the jury to hear evidence
that Bunch was being investigated for a bank robbery/homicide, which,
by inference, associated Berryman with Bunch and that investigation.
See id.
Berryman and Bunch appealed to the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Appellate Division, and the court allowed the men to raise the issues
concerning ineffective assistance of counsel in their petitions for postconviction relief. See id. After hearing testimony from DePalma, the
post-conviction hearing court found that trial counsel did not conduct an
ineffective defense so as to deprive Berryman of a fair trial. See id. Addressing the grounds set forth in Berryman's petition, the hearing court
found that: DePalma had conducted a reasonable investigation to ascertain the whereabouts of Bludson; the decision not to use Dos Santos as a
witness was a tactical one; the failure to use Campos' prior inconsistent
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statement had been a strategic choice; and DePalma's actions that opened
the door to the bank robbery/homicide investigation also had been a part
of a reasonable trial strategy. See id. The appellate division upheld the
convictions, and the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to grant certification. See id.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Berryman submitted a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey. See id. Finding that DePalma lacked any sort of sound
trial strategy, the district court concluded that Berryman had been denied
effective assistance of trial counsel and granted the writ of habeus corpus.
See id. at 1095-96. Willis Morton, Administrator of the New Jersey
State Prison at Trenton, and Peter Verniero, Attorney General of the
State of New Jersey, appealed. See id. at 1091. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, concluding that, under the
Strickland test, Berryman was deprived of his right to effective assistance
of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. See id. at 1105.
Judge McKee, writing for the unanimous panel, began the analysis
by setting forth the standard of review for an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. See id. at 1093-94 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). Under Strickland, the court noted, a defendant
must first demonstrate that representation was deficient by showing that
counsel's errors were so significant as to be in contravention of the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee. See id. at 1094. The panel recognized that a
defendant must then show that counsel's performance prejudiced the defense by depriving the defendant of the right to a fair trial. See id.
Judge McKee further stressed that while review of the district court's
holding was plenary, the court must permit a strong presumption that the
challenged action was a reasonable trial strategy. See id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Reese v. Fulcomer, 946 F.2d 247, 253 (3d Cir.
1991)).
The panel also examined the presumptive weight, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254, to be given to state court findings of fact. See id. The
Third Circuit concluded that the finding of the state court that trial counsel had a strategy was a factual finding entitled to a presumption of correctness if the record supports the factual finding. See id. at 1095. The
panel recognized, however, that whether the strategy was reasonable is a
question involving the application of legal principles and therefore merited de novo review. See id. The panel then explained that regardless of
whether the district court concluded that DePalma had no strategy at all
or no sound strategy, the district court's holding should be affirmed.
Judge McKee asserted that the record did not support the state
court's finding that DePalma did have a strategy at trial. See id. While
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the appellate division found that DePalma's strategy was based on the
theory that Campos had fabricated the rape, the Third Circuit maintained
that the record lacked support for any such theory. See id. at 1096.
Next, assuming that the record did support the finding of such a strategy,
the panel determined that the state court was wrong in concluding as a
matter of law that DePalma's strategy was reasonable as to each of the
grounds presented in Berryman's petition for post-conviction relief. See
id. at 1097.
The court addressed each of the grounds relied upon by Berryman in
his petition. See id. The panel first examined DePalma's failure to use
Campos' inconsistent identification testimony. See id. The court noted
that Campos' descriptions of the three men in Bludson's second trial
radically differed from the true height of each man, and conflicted with
Campos' identification testimony given at Bludson's first trial. See id. at
1098. Where Berryman's conviction was based on Campos' uncorroborated identification of Berryman, the court concluded, the appellate division was wrong in minimizing the significance of the inconsistent testimony, and asserted that DePalma's failure to use the testimony at trial
was entirely unreasonable. See id. at 1099.
Judge McKee next addressed DePalma's "opening the door" to the
bank robbery/homicide investigation. See id. The court rejected the appellate division's conclusion that DePalma had made a sound tactical decision in attempting to show that the lack of police investigation into the
rape was indicative that the police did not believe Campos. See id. The
Third Circuit found that the pursuit of such a strategy, with the knowledge that evidence as to the robbery/homicide investigation would then
be admissible, was "foolhardy" and ranked "'as a striking instance of
ineffective assistance of counsel.'" Id. at 1100.
Continuing with its examination, the panel then reviewed DePalma's
failure to investigate the potential defense witnesses, Dos Santos and
Bludson. See id. Realizing that both Dos Santos and Bludson could testify as to discrepancies within Campos' testimony, and thereby discredit
Campos before the jury, Judge McKee asserted that the failure to call
Dos Santos and Bludson as witnesses was not based on any sound trial
strategy and indicated inadequate trial preparation on the part of DePalma. See id. at 1100-01. Whatever the reason for not calling the potential witnesses, the court determined that DePalma's conduct "fell below the standards required for reasonable representation of one's client."
Id. at 1101.
After concluding that DePalma's performance was not supported by
a sound trial strategy, the Third Circuit moved on to the second prong of
the Strickland test and determined whether Berryman was prejudiced by
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DePalma's derelictions. See id. As stated by the court, this required a
determination as to whether, in the absence of counsel's errors, there was
a fair probability that the jury would have possessed a reasonable doubt
as to Berryman's guilt. See id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695).
Maintaining that DePalma's failures at trial were severe and significantly
threatened the integrity of Berryman's conviction, the Third Circuit resolved that Berryman had indeed been prejudiced by DePalma's inadequate representation and was entitled to the relief granted by the district
court. See id. at 1102.
Lastly, Judge McKee discussed the enactment of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) that amended 28
U.S.C. § 2254 while the state's appeal was pending, and established a
"'more deferential test'" for those cases where state prisoners contest
their convictions on grounds of alleged constitutional violations. See id.
at 1102-03 (quoting Dickerson v. Vaughn, 90 F.3d 87, 90 (3d Cir.
1996)). Although acknowledging that this court had yet to ascertain the
breadth of the deference that federal habeas courts must provide to the
legal or factual determinations of state courts, the judge noted the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the AEDPA in Lindh v. Murphy. See id.
at 1103 (citing 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc)). Pursuant to
Lindh, the court asserted, a state court's determination involving a mixed
question of fact and law can be found unreasonable by a federal habeas
court only when that court firmly believes that the state court's determination constituted a grave error. See id. The Third Circuit, refraining
from determining whether the AEDPA should be applied retroactively in
this case, nonetheless asserted that even if the court applied the more deferential standard dictated in Lindh, Berryman would still prevail. See id.
at 1104. The court therefore decided that the resolution of the case in favor of Berryman would be the same regardless of whether the amended
habeas statute was applied. See id. at 1105.
The Third Circuit correctly held that Berryman was entitled to a
writ of habeas corpus under the Strickland analysis because DePalma's
derelictions were indeed both flagrant and severe. It is discomforting to
imagine the injustice that would have transpired if Berryman was denied
the option of federal review of his state conviction. At a time when petitions for habeas corpus relief have increasingly been viewed as frivolous
delay tactics embraced by desperate death row inmates, the Third Circuit's decision in Berryman serves as a needed reminder of the true purpose of, and necessity for, habeas corpus relief in our criminal justice
system. For those members of the judiciary who will have the responsibility of interpreting the extent to which the newly enacted AEDPA will
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curtail future habeas corpus proceedings, the timing of this important
reminder is most opportune.
Thomas R. Calcagni

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW--FREE SPEECH-PROVISIONS OF THE NEW
JERSEY

LAW

DISCRIMINATION

AGAINST

DISCRIMINATION,

AGAINST HOMOSEXUALS,

WHICH

PROHIBIT

Do NOT

PRESENT

COGNIZABLE FIRST AMENDMENT FREE SPEECH CLAIMS UNDER 42

U.S.C. § 1983--Presbytery of New Jersey of the Orthodox
PresbyterianCurch v. Whitman, 99 F.3d 101 (3d Cir. 1996).
In its 1992 amendments to the Law Against Discrimination, N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12, subd. a (West 1993), the New Jersey State Legislature expressly included "affectional and sexual orientation" to the statute's list of protected classes. See Presbytery of New Jersey of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Rhitan, 99 F.3d 101, 103 (3d Cir.
1996). In effect, these amendments prohibited discrimination based on
sexual orientation in the contexts of employment, public accommodations, and general business relationships. See id. The Presbytery of
New Jersey of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church (Church) believed that
the new law effectively prevented it from adhering to its religious doctrine of avoiding business dealings with homosexuals and preaching
against homosexuality in general. See id. at 103-04.
In response to the legislature's enactment, the Church duly filed a §
1983 action in the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey, claiming that the 1992 amendments violated the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause. See id. at 103. The claim rested on the
following two arguments: (1) that the 1992 amendments were unconstitutionally overbroad, and (2) that the amendments presented a contentbased restriction on the constitutional right of free speech. See id. Specifically, the Church contended that provisions prohibiting the aiding and
abetting of discriminatory acts and requiring the posting of nondiscriminatory notices could subject its followers to private lawsuits. See id. at
104.
The district court addressed two primary issues. See id. at 104.
First, the district court determined whether the amended Law Against
Discrimination was unconstitutional on its face. See id. Rejecting the
Church's facial challenge, the court held that the 1992 amendments were
neither unconstitutionally overbroad nor content-based. See id. The
district court posited that the "secondary effects" doctrine had been sat-
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isfied because the provisions at issue did not target discriminatory
speech, but instead targeted the effects of such conduct. See id. Second,
the court invoked the Pullman abstention doctrine, which federal courts
employ when faced with a constitutional issue and certain unsettled state
law issues, and refrained from deciding whether the 1992 amendments
were unconstitutional "as applied" to the case at hand. See id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed
the district court's holding. See id. at 107. The court held that the
amended New Jersey Law Against Discrimination was not facially violative of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. See id. In addition, the circuit court concluded that the district court properly invoked
the Pul/man abstention doctrine on the Church's "as applied" challenge
to the amendments at issue. See id. at 106.
Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Nygaard began the court's
analysis by addressing the Church's facial challenge to the 1992 amendments. See id. at 104-05. The court relied on a two-part analysis for
First Amendment facial challenges as enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Ciy Council of the Cty of Los Angeles v. Taxpayersfor
Vincent. See id. at 104-05 (citing 466 U.S. 789 (1984)). The threejudge panel noted that the first part of the Vincent analysis asks whether
the legislation at issue "'create[d] an unacceptable risk of the suppression
of ideas.'" Id. at 105 (quoting Vincent, 466 U.S. at 797).
Applying the Vincent holding to the case at bar, the court opined
that there was no such suppression of ideas presented by the amended
Law Against Discrimination. See id. Judge Nygaard expressly agreed
with the district court's reasoning that, pursuant to the statute, a state
may constitutionally prohibit an individual from rewarding businesses
that use sexual orientation to discriminate against job applicants on the
basis of sexual orientation. See id. The judge explained that the prohibition of such a reward scheme failed to manifest the requisite effect of
illegally suppressing ideas. See id. Moreover, the Third Circuit posited
that the same rationale would apply to holding an individual liable under
the amended Law Against Discrimination for threatening an establishment if it did not agree to terminate its homosexual employees. See id.
Next, the court focused its attention on distinguishing a number of
cases invoked by the appellants to buttress their facial challenge. See id.
The panel rejected the appellants' contention that Dambrot v. Central
Michigan University and Doe v. University of Michigan mandated a
finding of a valid facial challenge in the case at hand. See id. (citing 55
F.3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1995); 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989)). The
court rationalized that those cases, unlike the case at bar, concerned facially invalid speech regulations that explicitly purported to target speech
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itself. See id. Nor was Judge Nygaard persuaded with appellants' argument that City of Houston v. Hill deemed the 1992 amendments unconstitutional. See id. (citing 482 U.S. 451 (1987)). The judge stressed that in
Hill the Supreme Court upheld a facial challenge to a state statute on the
grounds that the prohibited conduct had already been preempted by state
criminal law. See id. On the other hand, the court noted that the conduct restrictions within the amended Law Against Discrimination have
been in force in New Jersey for the last fifty years. See id.
Judge Nygaard asserted that the second method by which a statute
may be found facially unconstitutional under the Vincent two-part analysis is under the overbreadth doctrine. See id. Pursuant to the overbreadth doctrine, the judge emphasized, even a party whose activities are
unprotected may challenge a broadly written statute by arguing that the
statute infringes upon the rights of out-of-court parties whose activities
are protected. See id. at 105-06 (citing Vincent, 466 U.S. at 798-99).
Underlying the doctrine, the court noted, is the assumption that the mere
existence of the statute may have a chilling effect upon free speech in
general. See id. at 105 (citing Vincent, 466 U.S. at 798-99). In rejecting
the application of the overbreadth doctrine to the facts of the case at bar,
the panel pointed out that the appellants failed to allege that third parties,
whose activities are protected, might nevertheless find themselves within
the legal reach of the amended Law Against Discrimination. See id. at
106. In sum, the court pronounced that appellants did not meet their
burden of establishing that the 1992 amendments were facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause. See id.
Turning to the second count of the complaint, the Third Circuit
analyzed appellants' allegations that the Law Against Discrimination with
its 1992 amendments constituted an impermissible content-based restriction on free speech and was thus unconstitutional as applied. See id.
Noting that the district court examined the "as applied" challenge within
the facial challenge section of its opinion, Judge Nygaard instructed that
this extension of the facial analysis was unnecessary because the district
court had already determined that the statute did have constitutional application and was not subject to the overbreadth doctrine. See id. The
judge observed that the "as applied" challenge could only be determined
by asking whether the application of the 1992 amendments constituted, as
the appellants contended, an unconstitutional content-based restriction on
the First Amendment right to free speech. See id.
Next, Judge Nygaard addressed the issue of whether the district
court correctly employed the Pullman doctrine in abstaining from deciding the appellants' "as applied" challenge. See id. The Third Circuit
opined that the Pullman abstention doctrine may be invoked if three spe-
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cial circumstances are present: (1) the presence of unsettled questions of
state law within the federal constitutional claim; (2) the capability of state
courts to interpret the state law issues and thus substantially narrow or
eliminate the constitutional claims; and (3) the potential of federal courts
to disrupt state policies by erroneously construing the state law issues.
See id. If the Pullman three-part analysis is satisfied, the court posited,
then the question becomes whether, based on "equitable considerations,"
the district court correctly abstained under the circumstances. See id.
Applying the three-pronged Pullman test to the facts at hand, the
panel concluded that the district court had the authority to abstain from
ruling on the "as applied" challenge. See id. at 106-07. Noting that the
New Jersey Supreme Court interpreted the "aid and abet" language in
only one prior case involving commercial speech, Judge Nygaard determined that the language at issue was an unsettled issue of state law. See
id. at 107. Second, the judge enunciated that the state court may construe the language within the statute so as to refrain from reaching the
sort of conduct in which appellants engaged. See id. Explaining that an
erroneous interpretation of the 1992 amendments may have detrimental
effect on the other "aiding and abetting" sections of the statute, the court

conceded that potential for the disruption of state policy was present. See
id.
Turning to the "equitable considerations" analysis, the- Third Circuit stated that the district court's invocation of the Pullman abstention
doctrine was a permissible exercise of that court's discretion. See id.
Distinguishing subsequent Third Circuit cases involving situations of extreme time constraints, the court declared that the circumstances at hand
did not present the need to avoid the delay of adjudicating state law
questions in New Jersey courts. See id. In addition, the panel declared
that the delay sought to be avoided by the appellants was their own creation because they had the continuing opportunity to seek declaratory relief on the application of the statute by the state courts. See id. Thus,
the panel proclaimed, because the district court properly abstained from
determining appellants' "as applied" challenge and appellants failed to
allege a valid "facial challenge" to the statue, the lower court's holding
should be affirmed. See id.
The Third Circuit's analysis and the reasoning behind its rejection
of appellants' "facial challenge" to the amended Law Against Discrimination is scant and unconvincing. By merely recanting two scenarios in
which the prohibition of discriminatory acts would be constitutional, the
court failed to consider whether the statute could permissibly reach the
"aiding and abetting" speech that the appellants might use in a sermon in
opposition to homosexuality. In addition, the panel's use of distinguish-
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able cases to hold that the statute is not facially invalid neglects the true
issue at hand-the determination of when speech, such as the speech used
by the Church, would be considered "aiding and abetting," a discriminatory act for the purposes of state law.
Despite the lack of rationale behind the Third Circuit's "facial
challenge" holding, the court sensibly affirmed the district court's abstention of the "as applied" challenge. The panel's concern of usurping
other provisions of the Law Against Discrimination by erroneously interpreting the "aiding and abetting" provisions of the 1992 amendments was
justified in this case given the strong state interest in the war against discrimination. Moreover, Judge Nygaard noted that the appellants still
have the opportunity to seek declaratory relief from the state courts of
New Jersey.

Joseph G. Calella
ASSOCIATIONS-SPoRT

LAW--COURTS

MAY INTERVENE IN

THE

AFFAIRS OF A PRIVATE ORGANIZATION ONLY IF THE PLAINTIFF
HAD AN INTEREST IN THE ORGANIZATION'S DECISION THAT
WARRANTED JUDICIAL INTERVENTION AND THE ORGANIZATION
UNJUSTIFIABLY INTERFERED WITH THAT INTEREST-Schulz v.

United States Boxing Ass'n, 105 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 1997).
On December 9, 1995, the International Boxing Federation (IBF)
sponsored a heavyweight championship bout in Stuttgart, Germany between Axel Schulz of Germany and Francois Botha of South Africa. See
Schulz v. United States Boxing Ass'n, 105 F.3d 127, 129 (3d Cir. 1997).
Botha defeated Schulz and was crowned the IBF heavyweight champion.
Immediately following the fight and pursuant to IBF regulations, each
contestant was tested for the use of pain killers, anabolic steroids, and
other delineated substances that are proscribed by the organization's
rules. Botha tested positive for the use of steroids, although at that time
he denied using them.
The IBF is a subsidiary of the United States Boxing Association
(USBA), which is one of the three major bodies that regulate professional
boxing. See id. at 128. The USBA sponsors championship and nonchampionship boxing matches that are partially funded by charging contestants a participation fee. See id. at 128-29. The USBA, a national organization, created the IBF to serve as an instrumentality through which
it could crown world champions. See id. at 129. The goals of the IBF
are to provide greater uniformity and efficiency in the administration of
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professional boxing, and to promote the sport.
Upon formation, the IBF promulgated regulations to govern the
boxing matches that it sponsors. One rule requires participants, after
each bout, to provide a urine sample to be tested for the presence of
specified substances, such as steroids. That regulation further provides
that if a specimen tests positive, disciplinary measures will follow. Another rule prescribes the possible penalties for a violation of organization
rules, which include the imposition of a fine, relinquishment of prize
monies or title, or any other penalty ordered by the IBF committee and
approved by the IBF president.
Prior to the Botha/Schulz fight and in accordance with IBF policy,
each contestant paid the IBF in excess of $45,000, which included a participation fee, and each contestant's representative signed a document that
detailed the rules of the fight. These documents were also signed by the
IBF/USBA president and a German Boxing Federation representative.
The signed papers included a provision that required each challenger to
undergo a drug test following the fight and provided that if a boxer tested
positive for certain drugs, including pain killers and anabolic steroids,
disqualification and disciplinary action would ensue.
In response to Botha's positive drug test, on February 15, 1996, the
German Boxing Federation recommended that the IBF strip Botha of his
tide and name Schulz the IBF world champion. According to IBF rules,
however, if a winner is disqualified, the losing challenger does not become champion; instead, the championship title becomes vacant. See id.
at 134 n. 11. The German organization also barred all of its members,
including boxers, trainers, and promoters, from participating in Botha's
fights for two years. See id. at 129.
The following week, the IBF conducted a hearing in Elizabeth, New
Jersey, to decide what disciplinary action would be taken in response to
Botha's positive drug test. See id. at 130. Botha, his attorney, and two
of his physicians, as well as representatives of Schulz, the German Boxing Federation, and Michael Moorer, all testified at the hearing. Michael
Moorer was a former IBF heavyweight champion who sued the IBF in
New Jersey federal court in September 1995, seeking to stop the
Botha/Schulz fight and alleging that he was entitled to fight for the
championship title. Moorer and the IBF reached a settlement that set
forth that Moorer would dismiss the action in exchange for the IBF's
promise that he would fight the winner of the Botha/SchuLz bout, within
180 days of that match, for the IBF tide.
At the hearing, Botha stated for the first time that he had taken
steroids. Botha claimed, however, that he had done so unwittingly.
Botha explained that his South African doctor had sent him medication,
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which was the steroid that was detected in his urine, for arm stiffness.
After much deliberation, the IBF committee decided not to strip Botha of
his title because of mitigating circumstances, but did fine him $50,000
for having the steroid in his system in violation of organization regulations. See id. at 130-31. The committee also decided that Moorer would
fight Botha sometime before June 9, 1996, and that Schulz would challenge the winner of that match within four months. See id. at 131.
Schulz, his manager, and his promoters brought an action against
the IBF and the USBA in the United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey. See id. Moorer and Botha were included as necessary
defendants because they had interests in the suit. See id. Moorer filed a
crossclaim and a counterclaim seeking specific performance of his agreement with the IBF. See id.
The district court ruled that the plaintiffs were entitled to preliminary injunctive relief. See id. Accordingly, the court ordered, inter alia,
that the IBF/USBA disqualify Botha, and that Schulz and Moorer fight in
the IBF championship match agreed to in Moorer's settlement agreement.
See id. The district court explained that under New Jersey law, private
organizations may adopt, execute, and interpret their own internal regulations, and are afforded great deference by the courts upon review of
these regulations. See id. at 132. The court stated that the judiciary may
intervene, however, to protect the substantial interests of individuals
subject to the regulations when the entity departs from its own procedures. See id. The district court reasoned that IBF/USBA policy is clear
that drug use will result in disqualification, and therefore Schulz had a
significant chance of prevailing on the merits. See id.
Botha and the IBF/USBA both appealed the preliminary injunction,
and Schulz and Moorer sought to have it upheld. See id. at 131. On
June 22, 1996, Schulz and Moorer fought the match ordered by the preliminary injunction. See id. Moorer beat Schulz and regained the IBF
championship title. See id. On November 9, 1996, Botha fought
Moorer, and Moorer successfully defended his title. See id. Subsequently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling on the grounds that Schulz demonstrated
a likelihood of prevailing on the merits. See id. at 136.
Judge Pollak, writing for a unanimous panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, affirmed the district court's ruling. See id. at 136. The judge began the court's analysis by outlining
the Third Circuit's task-to determine whether the district court had
abused its discretion, made a clear mistake of fact, or committed an error
of law in imposing a preliminary injunction. See id. at 132. The Third
Circuit then commenced its examination of whether the district court had
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the power to set aside the decision of the IBF not to disqualify Botha.
See id. The judge noted that New Jersey courts are reluctant to interfere
with a private organization's internal affairs. See id.
The court acknowledged that in Rutledge v. Gulian, the New Jersey
Supreme Court described the limited circumstances in which a court may
overrule a private organization's conclusions regarding the punishment of
its members. See id. (citing 93 N.J. 113, 459 A.2d 680 (1983)). Judge
Pollak recounted the test outlined by the Rutledge court to review judicial
interference with a private organization's affairs. See id. at 133. First,
the judge proffered, the court must determine whether the plaintiff had an
interest in the organization's decision that was adequate to warrant judicial action. See id. The Third Circuit stated that if the response to this
query is yes, the court must then ascertain whether the defendant organization had unjustifiably interfered with that interest. See id.
Utilizing this test, Judge Pollak observed that the IBF's determination not to disqualify Botha clearly affected Schulz's standing in the
boxing community, as well as his public reputation. See id. Furthermore, the court emphasized, Schulz had an economic stake in being declared the winner of his fight with Botha, even though he would not have
become the champion, because he would have gone on to fight Moorer
for the unoccupied title. See id. at 133-34 & n. 12. The judge explained
that the preliminary injunction concerned Schulz's economic interest because Schulz would receive more money if he fought for a vacant title.
See id. at 134 n. 12. In sum, the Third Circuit resolved that Schulz possessed an interest in the IBF's determination not to disqualify Botha that
was sufficient to warrant judicial intervention. See id. at 134.
The court next addressed whether the IBF unjustifiably interfered
with Schulz's interest. See id. According to the Third Circuit, this determination rested on whether the IBF's unwillingness to disqualify Botha
violated the ideals of fundamental fairness or public policy. See id. The
court explained that if the IBF's refusal to disqualify Botha offended either of these concepts, judicial intervention was justified under the Rutledge standard. See id.
Turning to public policy, Judge Pollak consulted New Jersey legislation to ascertain the state's view on regulation of the sport of boxing.
See id. The court pointed out that New Jersey's legislative and executive
branches both stated that boxing should be strictly controlled and efficiently regulated to engender the public's confidence and trust. See id. at
135. The judge further noted that regulations promulgated by the New
Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety affirm the view that prohibiting the use of substances that may affect a boxer's performance promotes the public's trust and confidence in the sport. See id. The court
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stressed that the Department's regulations require that a boxer who uses a
banned drug before or during a bout be immediately disqualified from the
match and indefinitely suspended from boxing. See id.
The judge articulated that New Jersey's public policy as to boxing is
reflected in the IBF bout rules that were signed by the contestants and
representatives of the boxing organizations prior to the fight in Germany.
See id. In light of New Jersey's strong public policy, the Third Circuit
concurred with the district court's view that the IBF's rules could not
have been less demanding than those of New Jersey. See id. Judge Pollak commented that the fight occurred in Germany, not New Jersey;
however, the judge also observed that the German Boxing Federation
does not appear to condone drug use among its boxers. See id. The
court remarked that the German Boxing Federation requested that Botha
be subjected to disqualification for his steroid use and forbade its own
members from fighting Botha, or participating in his bouts, for two
years. See id.
The Third Circuit reiterated that New Jersey has embraced a policy
of encouraging public confidence and trust in boxing, and that the state
has mandated that participants who use drugs be disqualified. See id. In
addition, the court emphasized, the IBF has adopted an analogous rule
requiring disqualification for drug use. See id. The judge proclaimed
that the public's faith in boxing is eroded if one of the major boxing
regulatory bodies rejects its own rule that conforms with the public policy of the state. See id. Therefore, the court concluded that the failure
by the IBF to disqualify Botha was probably a violation of New Jersey's
public policy. See id.
Next, the Third Circuit summarized its conclusions under the Rutledge standard of review for judicial interference with the operations of a
private entity. See id. The court stated that Schulz's concern in the
IBF's determination warranted judicial protection, and that the decision
not to disqualify Botha presumably violated New Jersey public policy.
See id. at 136. Thus, the Third Circuit held that at this preliminary
stage, judicial intervention was merited because both prongs of the Rutledge standard were met. See id.
Judge Pollak opined, however, that this case could be decided alternatively under principles of contract law. See id. The Third Circuit observed that the core dispute in the present action was whether the IBF
transgressed its internal regulations and, if so, whether the judiciary may
intervene to require Botha's disqualification. See id. Nonetheless, because the case was at a preliminary stage, the court underscored that the
documents signed by the parties prior to the fight that set forth the bout
rules could be deemed an enforceable contract. See id.
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The judge emphasized that the documents were endorsed by representatives of all relevant parties, and that these signatures evidenced "an
intention to be bound by [the IBF's] rules." Id. The court explained that
the provisions embodied in the documents, including the stipulation that a
boxer who tested positive for drug use would be disqualified, were sufficiently definite to constitute a contract. See id. Judge Pollak stressed
that all parties provided consideration by agreeing to abide by the IBF's
rules. See id. Furthermore, the judge stated, additional consideration
was provided through the payment in excess of $45,000 to the IBF for
the privilege of competing in the IBF-supported bout. See id. In short,
the Third Circuit proffered, review under theories of contract law would
yield the same result as review under the Rutledge test-that Botha
should have been disqualified pursuant to the IBF's own terms. See id.
It is important that judicial review of a private organization's decision be available to organization members who feel that they have been
unjustly treated and have suffered a cognizable injury. Private organizations are free to promulgate their own rules and policies to govern inter-

nal operations. Once an entity does so, however, it must abide by its
regulations in order to provide predictability and fairness. Members of
an organization rely on the entity's stated policies, and are expected to
abide by them as well. When rules are indiscriminately disregarded,
some members are unfairly treated. From a fundamental fairness standpoint, an affected party must have a forum to enforce the rules to which
he or she agreed. The threat of possible judicial intervention may also
prevent private organizations from treating their respective members inequitably in the first place.
Michele S. Greif

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- FREEDOM OF RELIGION-CITY VIOLATED
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT BY
ERECTING A DISPLAY CONSISTING OF A CRECHE AND A MENORAH
IN FRONT OF CITY HALL-American avil Liberties Union v.

Schundler, 1997 WL 9251 (3d Cir. 1997).
During the holiday season for the past thirty years, the City of Jersey City (City) has displayed a creche, depicting the birth of Christ, and
a menorah, used by the Jewish faith to celebrate Hanukkah, on cityowned property, referred to as City Hall Plaza (Plaza), located on the
lawn in front of City Hall. See American ivil Liberties Union v.
Schundler, 1997 WL 9251 at *1 (3d Cir. 1997). The two symbols,
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which are both owned by the City, are usually displayed concurrently in
celebration of Christmas and Hanukkah. See id. at *2. In 1994, however, Hanukkah fell early, so the menorah was taken down before the
creche was erected. In addition to displaying the creche that year, the
City, on December 14, decorated an evergreen tree on the Plaza lawn
with traditional Christmas ornaments.
Through a letter sent to the mayor of Jersey City, the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) requested that the City reevaluate its
practice of exhibiting religious symbols on city-owned property. In response to this request, the City, on December 16, constructed a sign adjacent to the display on the Plaza that read: "Through this display and
others throughout the year, the City of Jersey City is pleased to celebrate
the diverse cultural and ethnic heritages of its peoples." Therefore,
when the ACLU initially filed this action, the City's holiday display
consisted of the sign, the creche, and the Christmas tree.
The ACLU, on December 21, 1994, brought this action in the Superior Court of New Jersey, requesting relief through both a declaratory
judgment and a permanent injunction that would prohibit the City from
displaying the creche and the menorah on the city-owned Plaza during the
holiday season. See id. In its complaint, the ACLU contended that the
display violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution, as well as similar provisions of the New Jersey
Constitution. See id. After the City removed the case to federal district
court, both parties filed motions for summary judgment. See id.
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
granted the ACLU's summary judgment motion on November 28, 1995,
holding that the City's display violated the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment and the Religious Preference Clause of the New Jersey
Constitution. See id. at *3.Accordingly, the court entered an injunction
permanently preventing the City from displaying the creche and menorah,
or any similar display or scene, on the Plaza or on any property owned
or controlled by the City. See id.
Despite the injunction, the City, on December 13, 1995, erected its
annual, albeit modified, holiday display on the Plaza in front of City
Hall. See id. This display consisted of the menorah and the creche, but
also included a red wooden sled and two plastic figures, one depicting
Santa Claus and the other depicting Frosty the Snowman. See id. The
creche differed slightly from the one erected the previous year in that the
manger was empty because its figures had been removed and placed in a
circle on one side of the manger. See id. Furthermore, the display contained the evergreen tree, which, in addition to its usual holiday ribbons
and lights, was also decorated with Kwanzaa symbols. See id. Finally,
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the City accompanied its display with two signs identical in wording to
the one erected in 1994. See id.
The ACLU then submitted to the district court applications for both
a preliminary injunction prohibiting the further exhibition of the creche
and the menorah, and a judgment holding the City in civil contempt of
the court's injunction issued on November 28, 1995. See id. The district court, however, denied both of the ACLU's requests, concluding
that the addition of the Frosty and Santa figures, along with the wooden
sled and Kwanzaa symbols, sufficiently "demystified" the display, thus
bringing it into compliance with the First Amendment's Establishment
Clause. See id. at *3-*4. The court modified the November 28 order by
requiring the City to display the secular holiday exhibits along with the
creche and the menorah to keep its display from running afoul of the Establishment Clause. See id. at *3. Subsequently, both parties filed
timely appeals with the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. See id. at *4.
Writing for the majority, Judge Lewis, joined by Judge Nygaard,
held that the City's 1994 display violated the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution. See id. at *1, *19.
Additionally, the court concluded that the district court had applied the
wrong standard in determining that the modified 1995 display was constitutional. See id.
Judge Lewis began the court's opinion by noting that the test set out
by the United States Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman (the "Lemon
Test") provides the framework by which a court must be guided when
determining whether a particular practice is violative of the Establishment
Clause. See id. at *4 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)).
Therefore, the court posited, to be in compliance with the Clause, the
practice at issue must: (1) possess a secular purpose; (2) neither inhibit

nor advance religion; and (3) not foster an overly substantial governmental entanglement with religion. See id. at *5 (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at
612-13).
Judge Lewis recounted that the Supreme Court first used the Lemon
Test to assess the constitutionality of a government-backed religious holiday display in Lynch v. Donnelly. See id. (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668 (1984)).

In that case, Judge Lewis elaborated, the Court up-

held the constitutionality of a holiday display that was owned by the city,
but was erected in a private park and contained a creche, a Christmas
tree, a Santa Claus house, a wishing well, candy-striped poles, colored
lights, live carolers, and a "Seasons Greetings" banner. See id. Application of the Lemon Test, Judge Lewis offered, led a narrow majority of
the Court to conclude that the display had a secular purpose that neither
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advanced nor inhibited religion, and did not amount to a governmental
entanglement in religion. See id. Focusing on Justice O'Connor's concuffing opinion, the judge noted that the Justice had fashioned from the
second prong of the Lemon Test an "endorsement test," which prohibits
a governmental endorsement of religion that "sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders,
favored members of the political community." Id. (quoting Lynch, 465
U.S. at 688) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). Judge Lewis emphasized Justice O'Connor's belief that the context of the specified governmental
practice must be carefully scrutinized to determine whether the Establishment Clause has been offended. See id.
Next, the majority turned to the Supreme Court's decision in Allegheny County v. ACLU, where the Court rejected the constitutionality of
a creche placed on the Grand Staircase inside the county courthouse, but
upheld the constitutional validity of a holiday display, consisting of a
menorah, a Christmas tree, and a sign exalting liberty, located outside a
city-county building. See id. at *6 (citing Allegheny County v. ACLU,
492 U.S. 573 (1989)). Judge Lewis noted that the Court adopted Justice
O'Connor's "endorsement" analysis from Lynch to conclude that the creche standing alone within the county courthouse amounted to a constitutionally impermissible governmental endorsement of a Christian message.
See id. at *6-*7. In contrast, Judge Lewis remarked, the Court upheld
the display of the menorah and Christmas tree, but for different reasons.
See id. at *7-*8. The judge explained that Justice Blackmun's opinion
contended that the two symbols represented holidays that have both
achieved a secular status in modern society, while Justice O'Connor, in
concurrence, concluded that the presence of the secular Christmas tree
coupled with the salute to liberty obscured the menorah's religious impact. See id.
Judge Lewis then analyzed the decision in Capitol Square Review &
Advisory Board v. Pinette, in which the Court held that Ohio could not
justify its refusal to grant the Ku Klux Klan's application to erect and
display an unattended cross on the square of the statehouse by contending
that such a display would violate the Establishment Clause. See id. at *9
(citing Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440
(1995)). Judge Lewis proffered that although a four-justice plurality of
the Court rejected application of the "endorsement" analysis to a privately funded display of a cross in a public forum, the plurality indicated
that the analysis should be applied in cases involving governmentsponsored speech. See id. at *9-*10. Noting that Justice O'Connor,
joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, had argued for the application of
the "endorsement" test even to the privately-sponsored speech at issue in
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Capitol Square, Judge Lewis indicated that a majority of the Court's Justices would apply the test to determine the validity "of a governmentsponsored religious display on government property." Id. Thus, the
Third Circuit held that the "endorsement test" should be applied to determine whether the 1994 display erected by the City of Jersey City violated the Establishment Clause. See id. at *10.
Judge Lewis began the court's analysis of the City's 1994 display by
noting that the creche depicts an event lying at the core of Christianity:
the birth of Jesus Christ, the son of God, to the Virgin Mary in the manger. See id. Thus, the judge commented, the creche is an unambiguous
religious symbol representing a belief that is not shared by all citizens of
this country. See id. Although this symbol is pervasively exhibited
during the holiday season, the judge declared that its religious significance is not diminished in any way. See id.
Judge Lewis then stated that because the City, and not some other
group, had erected the creche itself on publicly owned property, the City
had sent a more significant message of religious endorsement than it
would have had it merely provided a forum for privately-sponsored religious speech. See id. at *11. The judge explained that by prominently
displaying a religious symbol on public property located in front of City
Hall, the City had risked "making religion relevant, in reality or in public perception, to status in the political community." Id. (quoting Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 626) (O'Connor, J, concurring)). The majority, therefore, concluded that the city's display of the creche on the
Plaza conveyed an endorsement of a religious message. See id.
The judge opined that the City, by using public money to erect and
maintain the creche, had directly implicated the Establishment Clause.
See id. The Clause, the majority offered, provides constraints on the use
of public money for religious purposes and compels the government to
act neutrally toward religion. See id. Furthermore, the judge proffered,
by using taxpayer monies to fund a religious display, the City increased
the likelihood that the religious message represented by the display would
be attributed to all Jersey City citizens. See id.
Judge Lewis then remarked that the City's inclusion of the menorah,
Christmas tree, and sign in its 1994 holiday display did not diminish the
endorsement conveyed by the creche. See id. The menorah, the majority
submitted, is a religious symbol, and its inclusion with the creche further
enhanced the display's religious message. See id. Moreover, the judge
asserted, the Christmas tree's "token inclusion" in the display failed to
convince the court that the City's display amounted to anything other
than an impermissible endorsement of both Christianity and Judaism. See
id. The majority agreed that this conclusion was consistent with Supreme
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Court precedent that proscribes governmental endorsement of a religious
message, especially when the message is unambiguous, publicly funded,
and visibly displayed on the property of the City government. See id. at
*12.
The court then rejected the City's diversity/pluralism justification
for the display, declaring it to be unconstitutional for three reasons. See
id. First, the judge advanced, the particular endorsement by the government of any number of religions is unconstitutional. See id. Second, the
majority continued, a reasonable observer would most likely not be cognizant of the various cultural and religious celebrations that take place in
the City throughout the year. See id. Third, Judge Lewis explained, the
City's celebration of many religions represents an example of a governmental entanglement with religion. See id.
Proceeding to address each reason separately, the judge announced
that the City had misread Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Allegheny County, in. which, the City maintained, the Justice had concluded
that a governmental celebration of several different religions does not
amount to an "endorsement." See id. at *13 (citing Allegheny County,
492 U.S. at 635-36) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). Judge Lewis explained
that Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Allegheny County clearly stated
that a celebration by the government of one particular religion, or several
different religions, could constitute an impermissible endorsement. See
id. Although the majority noted that not every governmental celebration
of the diversity of its citizens need be completely free of religious content, Judge Lewis concluded that a celebration of two or more religions
by a government is not necessarily transformed into a secularized celebration of pluralism. See id.
Addressing the City's contention that a "reasonable observer"
would view the 1994 display as part of Jersey City's year-round celebration of diversity, the majority examined the two distinct definitions of a
"reasonable observer" offered by the Supreme Court in Capitol Square.
See id. at *14. The majority rejected the definition of this hypothetical
person submitted by Justice O'Connor, noting that in the Justice's opinion, the "reasonable observer" possessed significant knowledge of the
"history and context" of the governmental activity at issue. See id.
(quoting Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2455) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). Instead, the majority agreed with Justice Stevens and propounded
that imputing such knowledge to the "reasonable observer" was highly
speculative. See id. (citing Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2470) (Stevens,
J., dissenting)). Furthermore, the majority posited, when determining
whether a governmental display amounts to an endorsement, a court must
also consider the perspectives of those residents of the community who
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embrace minority religious views and those who are new to the community. See id. at *14-*15.
Accordingly, the court decided that a
"reasonable observer" could not be presumed to possess knowledge of
the City's various religious and cultural celebrations, because such an
awareness was "obscured by the physical presence of the symbols of
Christianity and Judaism before City Hall." Id. at *15.
Finally, the judge stated that by erecting the challenged display, the
City had engaged in activity that promotes an "excessive entanglement
with religion." Id. (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613). Judge Lewis
commented that even if the City could avoid "endorsing" religion
through its celebration of different cultures and religions, it would be unable to avoid an excessive entanglement in the implementation of the
celebration. See id. at *16. Planning such celebrations, the majority
explained, would necessarily involve making judgments about which
cultural and religious holidays to celebrate, which symbols to display,
and which messages to convey. See id.The government's involvement
in making these decisions, the court continued, would inevitably be
guided by politics that would alienate certain segments of the political
community and produce divisiveness. See id. Therefore, the majority
concluded that the City's intention to celebrate many different cultures
and religions would constitute an impermissible entanglement of religion
and government. See id.
Turning to the district court's consideration of the City's 1995 display, Judge Lewis declared that the lower court's decision to modify its
November 28 injunction to require inclusion of the secular items was
flawed. See id. at *17. Judge Lewis propounded that the district court
had erred in deciding that the additions of Santa, Frosty, and the sled had
"demystified" the display, thus rendering it in compliance with the Establishment Clause. See id. The court proffered that placing a secular
symbol next to a religious one does not necessarily make a display constitutionally permissible. See id. at *18. Thus, the court determined that
the "token additions" of the secular symbols did not alter the context of
the display, and were insufficient to secularize its message. See id.
In conclusion, the majority held that the City's display of a menorah
and a creche on the Plaza violated the Establishment Clause. See id. at
*19. Additionally, the majority rejected the district court's modification
of the November 28 injunction and the accompanying rationale that the
inclusion in 1995 of Santa, Frosty, and the sled had "demystified" the
display, thereby bringing it into conformity with the First Amendment.
See id. Accordingly, the court vacated the lower court's modified injunction and remanded the case for further consideration consistent with
its opinion. See id.
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In a concurring opinion, Judge McKee expressed agreement with the
reasoning set forth in the majority opinion, but noted that the court's
analysis of this issue should not have focused on the Supreme Court's
decision in Capitol Square, a case involving privately-sponsored speech
in a public forum. See id. at *19 (McKee, J., concurring) (citing Capitol
Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995)). The
judge opined that Capitol Square did not illuminate the court's inquiry
because the Jersey City displays did not amount to private speech, but,
instead, were owned and erected by the City. See id. at *20 (McKee, J.,
concurring). The judge, however, concurred with the majority's decision
that the 1994 display was constitutionally impermissible under Lynch,
Allegheny, and Lemon, and that the case should be remanded to determine the validity of the 1995 display. See id.
The majority's decision correctly declared that the Jersey City display violated the Establishment Clause. After a painstaking analysis of
several Supreme Court cases, the majority concluded that a publicly
funded depiction of the birth of Jesus Christ placed on the public lawn in
front of the City's seat of government unquestionably conveyed an impermissible endorsement of religion. Although this conclusion, along
with the court's legalistic analysis of such a sacred symbol, may seem regrettable to some, the majority essentially had no choice. Bound by High
Court precedent, the majority's pronouncement was constitutionally mandated given the nature and context of the City's display. This case, with
the sensitive issue of religious expression at its core, serves as a stark
reminder that politically insulated judges are best suited to render potentially unpopular decisions in order to uphold important First Amendment
principles.
Paul L. Kattas
CIVIL PROCEDURE-INDISPENSABLE

PARTIES---WHERE ALL THE

PARTNERS OF A PARTNERSHIP ARE BEFORE THE COURT, THE
PARTNERSHIP ITSELF Is NOT NECESSARILY AN INDISPENSABLE

PARTY--H.B. Gen. Corp. v. Manchester Partners, 95 F.3d 1185
(3d Cir. 1996).
This diversity suit arose from a dispute among members of H.B.
Partners, L.P. (the Partnership), a limited partnership. See H.B. Gen.
Corp. v. Manchester Partners, 95 F.3d 1185, 1188 (3d Cir. 1996).
Plaintiffs H.B. General Corporation (H.B. General) and H.B. Limited
Corporation (F.B. Limited), both Delaware corporations with their prin-
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cipal places of business in Vermont, brought suit in the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey against Manchester Partners
(Manchester), which was organized under New Jersey law and had all of
its partners qualifying as New Jersey residents. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that Manchester was responsible for breaching the
parties' partnership agreement. See id. at 1189. In response, Manchester filed a counterclaim against H.B. General, H.B Limited, and thirdparty defendants, alleging that plaintiffs were in breach of the partnership
agreement, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and their fiduciary duties with respect to Manchester.
Manchester, after filing an unsuccessful motion to have the case
transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Vermont, filed an identical action in Vermont state court, seeking basically
the same relief as that requested in its counterclaim in the case before the
New Jersey district court. See id. at 1189-90. Manchester then moved
to dismiss the action pending before the district court in New Jersey on
the basis that the New Jersey court lacked proper subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 1190. Manchester argued that despite the complete diversity that existed among the three partners, the Partnership itself,
which for diversity purposes shared the citizenship of all the parties, destroyed diversity, as it was an indispensable party to the suit. See id. at
1188, 1190.
The New Jersey district court granted Manchester's motion. See id.
at 1190. The court determined, upon application of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 19(a), that the Partnership had a substantial interest in the litigation and therefore should be joined if "feasible." See id. Moreover,
the court held that in light of the prejudice to both Manchester and the
Partnership if the partnership entity were not included in the litigation,
the Partnership was an indispensable party under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 19(b). See id. Accordingly, while noting that for diversity
purposes a limited partnership is deemed a citizen of every state of which
its partners are citizens, the court dismissed the case for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, as joinder of the Partnership destroyed diversity. See
id. (citing Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185 (1990)).
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Judge Becker, writing for a unanimous court, reversed the decision
of the district court, holding that joinder of the Partnership was not required because all of the Partnership's members were already before the
district court. See id. at 1188, 1198-99. Buttressing its holding, the
court asserted the following: (1) the presence of all partners would ensure that Manchester would not be prejudiced, as appropriate protective
provisions could be included in the district court's judgment; (2) the
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Partnership was adequately represented, because all of its partners were
before the court; and (3) there was no danger of piecemeal litigation, as
Manchester's counterclaims against the Partnership could be heard under
28 U.S.C. § 1367, allowing the district court to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction. See id.
Initially, the court noted that it would review the district court's
Rule 19(a) decision, requiring joinder if "feasible," under a plenary
standard of review, and the district court's 19(b) decision, determining
whether a party is indispensable, under an abuse of discretion standard.
See id. at 1190. Next, the circuit court explained that Rule 19 determines whether joinder of a particular party is compulsory. See id. Judge
Becker further elucidated that a court must first determine whether a
party should be joined if "feasible" under Rule 19(a). See id. The court
explained that if for some reason joinder is not "feasible," a court must
then use Rule 19(b) to decide whether "in equity and good conscience"
See id. Upon applying
the party should be deemed "indispensable."
Rule 19(a) to the present action, Judge Becker, agreeing with the district
court, asserted that joinder of the Partnership was necessary under Rule
19(a)(2) if "feasible." See id.
Continuing, the court explained that under Carden v. Arkoma Assodates, which held that a limited partnership is deemed a citizen of every
state of which its partners are citizens, joinder in the instant matter was
not "feasible." See id. (citing Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185
(1990)). The court asserted that because the suit was brought by citizens
of both Vermont and Delaware against a citizen of New Jersey, diversity
in the case at bar would be destroyed by joinder of the Partnership, as it
is considered, under Carden, a citizen of Vermont, New Jersey, and
Delaware. See id. at 1190-91. Judge Becker articulated that because
joinder was not "feasible" in the instant matter, the case should be dismissed if the Partnership were determined to be an indispensable party
under Rule 19(b). See id. at 1191. Accordingly, the court announced
that the central issue was whether "in equity and good conscience" the
case could proceed despite the Partnership's absence. See id.
Delving into its Rule 19(b) analysis, the court first explained that
"pragmatic considerations" determine whether a party should be deemed
indispensable. See id. Next, Judge Becker listed the Rule 19(b) factors
that must be considered in determining whether a party is indispensable.
See id. Applying the first factor, which examines the extent to which a
decision rendered in the party's absence may prejudice the person or parties to the litigation, the judge concluded that proper protective provisions in the final judgment could effectively nullify any prejudice Manchester may suffer as a result of the Partnership's exclusion. See id.
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While acknowledging that Manchester could suffer prejudice if the
Partnership were to bring a subsequent claim against Manchester identical
to the one presently before the court, the Third Circuit emphasized that
like a marionette, a partnership cannot move unless a human being actually pulls its strings. See id. Accordingly, Judge Becker asserted that
because all the partners were presently before the court, prejudice to
Manchester could be avoided upon judgment via a court order enjoining
all of the parties in the instant action from bringing an identical suit on
the Partnership's behalf. See id. Moreover, the court elaborated, the
district court could mandate that, as a condition of the judgment, H.B.
General must make the Partnership release its claims against Manchester.
See id. at 1191-92. Such a requirement, the court explained, would
guarantee that even if one of the partners were to assign its interest in the
Partnership to another person, that person could not bring suit on the
Partnership's behalf. See id.
Continuing, the Third Circuit also disagreed with the district court's
decision that the Partnership's exclusion would prejudice the Partnership.
See id. at 1192. Initially, Judge Becker noted that although indispensability pursuant to Rule 19 is decided under federal law, state law governs
the nature of the concerned individuals' interests. See id. Accordingly,
the judge confronted whether, under the relevant state law (Delaware),
the Partnership had an interest in the litigation. See id. Upon examining
Delaware law, the court concluded that the Partnership had an interest in
the instant case. See id. at 1192-93.
Notwithstanding this determination, the Third Circuit rebuffed the
district court's conclusion that the Partnership's interests would be
prejudiced by its exclusion. See id. at 1193. In support of this decision,
Judge Becker stressed that although a partnership does have interests, it
is an artificial entity whose interests are derived from the interests of its
human members. See id. Thus, the court concluded that in certain
cases, because a partnership's interests as an entity embody the interest of
each individual partner, a partnership's interests can effectively be represented by its partners. See id. Pointing out that the Partnership's members were parties to the litigation, the court then insisted that the Partnership's interests were adequately represented by the partners'
participation. See id. The Third Circuit reasoned that the Partnership's
interests could be represented adequately by the H.B. entities, as their
interests were not antagonistic. See id. The court also noted that to the
extent that the Partnership's interests diverged from the H.B. entities'
interests, Manchester could protect the Partnership's interests. See id.
Proceeding, the Third Circuit dismissed the district court's emphasis

on the action's derivative nature. See id. at 1194. After engaging in a
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thorough analysis of whether the H.B. entities' suit should be characterized as direct or derivative, Judge Becker declared that for purposes of
this appeal, it was not necessary to characterize the H.B. entities' suit.
See id. at 1194-95. The court explained that even if state law would, in a
derivative action, require joinder of a partnership, federal law is still
governed by Rule 19 and, as a result, such a requirement under state law
would have no impact on the balancing of interests mandated under federal law. See id. at 1195. Thus, the court asserted that a derivative
characterization would have no impact on the court's prior analysis regarding the Partnership's and the partners' respective interests. See id.
Finally, the Third Circuit recognized that the Supreme Court of the
United States has held that a corporation is an indispensable party in an
action brought derivatively by the corporation's stockholders. See id. at
1196 (citing Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970)). The court
asserted, however, that such a bright line rule, if that was the Supreme
Court's intent, is inconsistent with the Court's admonition that there is
"no prescribed formula" for determining whether a party is indispensable. See id. (citing Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 118 & n.14 (1968)). Moreover, Judge Becker emphasized that a partnership's interests are clearly distinguishable from
that of a corporation. See id. Thus, the court reiterated that the individual partners in the case at bar would effectively represent the Partnership's interests. See id.
Continuing along a similar line of analysis, the court quickly dismissed the notion that Rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that "[e]very action shall be prosecuted in the name of
the real party in interest," may require the Partnership's inclusion. Id.
(quoting FED. R. CIw. P. 17(a)). While admitting that the characterization of an action as derivative might impact joinder via Rule 17, the court
determined that regardless of whether the H.B. entities' claims are derivative or on the Partnership's behalf, Rule 17 does not require the Partnership's joinder. See id. In explanation, Judge Becker articulated that
Rule 17 does not mandate that all parties that qualify as real parties in
interest under Rule 17 be included in a suit. See id. (citing FED. R. CIv.
P. 17(a)). As such, the court opined that any fear of future litigation
brought by the Partnership could be remedied through protective provisions contained within the final judgment. See id. at 1197.
Finally, the Third Circuit addressed Manchester's claim, one that
was not relied upon by the district court in its decision, that the Partnership was an indispensable party to its counterclaims against the H.B. entities, and that joinder would destroy diversity and, consequently, the
federal court's subject matter jurisdiction. See id. Judge Becker clarified
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Manchester's misinterpretation of the law, asserting that the Partnership
could be joined as a party to Manchester's counterclaims without destroying the district court's subject matter jurisdiction. See id. The judge
emphasized that complete diversity is only necessary where federal jurisdiction is asserted under the federal diversity statute. See id. (citing 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (1996)). The court then elaborated that the district court
could entertain Manchester's counterclaim with the Partnership as a party
under Title 28, § 1367 of the United States Code, the supplemental jurisdiction statute. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1990)). Section
1367 of Title 28, the judge highlighted, provides that if a federal court
has jurisdiction over a claim, it can exercise jurisdiction over other
claims lacking an independent jurisdictional basis if those claims "are so
related to the claims" within the court's jurisdictional reach "that they
form part of the same case or controversy under Article II of the United
States Constitution." Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1990)).
After detailing 28 U.S.C. § 1367's specific provisions, the Third
Circuit noted that it has expressly held in a diversity case that a court
may hear a counterclaim against a non-diverse party joined as a thirdparty defendant to a counterclaim under the supplemental jurisdiction
statute. See id. at 1197-98. As such, the court maintained that the only
remaining issue to be decided was whether Manchester's counterclaims
were "'so closely related to [the H.B. entities' claims] that they form part
of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution.'" See id. at 1198 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1990)).
Judge Becker next explained that to be considered a part of the same
case or controversy, the claims must share notable factual elements. See
id. Because Manchester's counterclaims relied upon and involved the
same facts as its defense to the plaintiffs' claims, the court determined
that Manchester's counterclaims were within the district court's supplemental jurisdiction. See id. Accordingly, the court espoused that despite
the Partnership's and Manchester's shared New Jersey citizenship, joinder of the Partnership as to the counterclaims did not destroy the court's
subject matter jurisdiction. See id.
In conclusion, the Third Circuit announced that the district court's
dismissal of this action was an abuse of discretion. See id. Reemphasizing the particular points of its decision, the court asserted that
because every partner of the small partnership was included in the action,
the exclusion of the Partnership itself would cause no prejudice to the
Partnership or Manchester. See id. Moreover, the court insisted that the
plaintiffs' action could proceed absent the Partnership, regardless of
whether the action could be characterized as derivative. See id. at 1199.
Lastly, the court reiterated that the counterclaims against the Partnership
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could be included in this action under the court's supplemental jurisdiction and, thus, there would be no possibility of piecemeal litigation. See
id. Accordingly, the Third Circuit reversed the district court's decision
and remanded the case for further proceedings. See id.
The Third Circuit should be commended for the pragmatism employed in reaching this decision. The court adeptly recognized that Rule
19 should not be used as a vehicle to move cases from federal court to
state court simply because it serves one party's interest but, rather,
should be used to allow justice to be served with as little litigation as
possible. The court properly focused on the fact that all of the partners
of the Partnership were already involved in the litigation. Thus, it would
be possible to prevent prejudice and future piecemeal litigation through
protective provisions in the district court's judgment. Moreover, the fact
that § 1367 of Title 28 of the United States Code allowed the Partnership
to be joined as a party to Manchester's counterclaims without destroying
the district court's subject matter jurisdiction further fortifies the Third
Circuit's decision. Allowing dismissal in this case would have been inimical to the purpose and spirit of Rule 19(b); the court's sensible approach in this decision should be emulated by future courts.
Jennifer R. Rossi

